This paper reviews the key concepts underlying the diagnosis of "borderline personality disorder" as exemplified in the work of Otto Kernberg. It looks both to history and philosophy (Rousseau), to social thought (Erving Goffman) and to psychoanalysis (Deutsch, Freud, Lacan) 
and thus wreak havoc on the social order around the patient. 8 In other words, unstable or absent object relations underlie the bp's "clear-cut anti-social personality structure" (Kernberg 13). The underlying structure of the bp's behavioral disorders is thus presumptively the patient's flawed object-relations. A case history by Kernberg sums up his points:
A promiscuous, divorced, young woman, hospitalized after a psychotic regression, which followed years of disorganized behavior, was restricted in the hospital from male patients. On several occasions a few minutes of When the physician suggests that not all sexual freedom implies prostitution, the patient becomes angry, calling him 'immoral.' This leads her to becoming "involved sexually with several other patients in a provocative manner," and that, in turn, leads the physician to confront her with "her masochistic fantasies. . . of submission to a primitive, sadistic superego which represented a prohibitive, combined father-mother image."
But it all comes to a 'happy ending' very quickly. After this confrontation, the woman Was finally able to establish a good relationship with one patient, with whom she fell in love, went steady for a two-year period, and who she eventually planned to marry. During the latter part of these two years they had sexual intercourse, characterized by her being able for the first time in her life to have tender as well as sexual feelings toward just one man. . . (104) Such 'happy endings' are, of course, exactly what Jacques Lacan criticized in contemporary psychoanalysis and especially in the American approach: the tendency to seek the patient's conformity and smooth adaptation to prevailing behavioral normsmost pointedly, in this case, sexual ones. Such adaptation makes them and the world around them less disturbed: i.e., "happier."
Yet it is easy to see where Kernberg's approach is problematic. It has to endow the treating doctor with extraordinary powers of perception, almost x-ray vision, and with an automatic superiority over the patient, who is never, we should note, given to us in her own words, except one: "immoral"-a social term. Moreover, despite the critical importance of the prevailing social norms in defining bpd, Kernberg shows absolutely no recognition of the fact that the social context and (its prevailing norms)
were rapidly changing Compare sociologist Erving Goffman, who did take note of the changes in the behavioral norms of the day:
In the last few years the non-psychiatric character of considerable symptomlike behavior has become much easier to appreciate because situational improprieties of the most flagrant kind have become widely used as a tactic by hippies, the New Left, and black militants, and although these persons have been accused of immaturity, they seem too numerous to be able to sustain collective rapport, and too facile at switching into conventional behavior to be accused of insanity. 355-6
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There is an even more grievous difficulty with Kernberg's approach than that of his ignoring the changed social context of his treatments. It is his assumption that the antisocial borderline personality disorder is rooted in a disturbed ego-object relation that sets off misbehaviors, and that which only the trained psychiatrist can access. Can we really separate the 'chicken from the egg' (the priority of social or the mental) that produces the bp's chronic 'anti-socialism'? Goffman, at least, turned the whole business around, and made the social definition of the 'mental patient' primarily an effect of social arrangements, with no need to resort to the hypothesis of an 'underlying structure, ' Goffman might say that Kernberg's exemplifies a "traditional social control approach
[that is] an unrealistically mechanistic version of the social act…" (349), whereas he himself proposes that groups are, in reality, a variable order of shifting alliances whose arbitrariness (and vulnerability to change) is willingly ignored by most people. At the same time, this arbitrary structure is precisely what the borderline patient senses and focuses on, seeing it rather more clearly than Kernberg, "sociologists" and "psychiatrists" do.
Who is right? The Kernberg approach is to separate and neatly partition off the disordered mind such that it neither influences nor is influenced by social changes. But is the bpo really, as per Kernberg, locked inside the ego of the patient: a walled off, 'underlying structure' that breaks out of its prison into disruptive acts and behavior? Is this underlying structure so deeply hidden that only the expert psychiatrist is skilled enough to enter its 'frightening' domain? Or is borderline disorder a more or less 'purely' social problem of the surface, a la Goffman: a twin failure to keep to one's "place" and to credit the established order of social groups--failures that provoke the 'anti-social' behavior that causes the rebel to be labeled a 'mental patient'?
Goffman's reasoned, fierce and unanswered critique of medicalized psychiatry and cognitive-behavioral psychology prompts a number of questions that I would like to begin to address here.
I. What are the Borderlines of Psychoanalysis?
My first concern will be the borderlines of psychoanalysis, (rather than medical psychiatry). Does psychoanalysis avoid the impasse that Goffman's response to the psychiatry of his day, as exemplified by Kernberg provides?
Freudian psychoanalysis, from the beginning, always crisscrossed the psychical, social and cultural orders. For Freud, as later for Lacan, the very premise of psychoanalysis is that the subject is always already a trans-subject, linked to others by history, genealogy and the social division of labor and wealth. Freud put it this way in his "History of the Psychoanalytic Movement": each subject, he says, is "linked already to other subjects. . . as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily." 11 Further, Freud says that he could never see mental patients as a distinct category, divided sharply from ordinary human beings. Indeed, while studying hysterics with Breuer, Freud tells how he began to realize that "everywhere I seemed to discern motives and tendencies [in the patients] analogous to those of everyday life," (SE XIV 11). This led him to doubt seriously that any part of the mental apparatus was sealed off from the others, which is precisely the opposite conclusion from Breuer's. Breuer had constructed a hypothesis of 'hypnoid states' that explained the "mental splitting in hysterical patients by the absence of communication between various mental states" (11). According to Breuer, the "hypnoid state" sent "its products," like little bullets, to penetrate into "waking consciousness like unassimilated foreign bodies" (11 The result of his refusal to credit the existence of separate, walled off mental states was
Freud's theory of repression, which, when one looks at his famous sketch of the psychical apparatus is a line only part of the way through it. There is not nor can there be an actual wall dividing conscious and unconscious, ego and id. The first person who, having drawn a line around a piece of land, decided to say, 'This is mine' and found others fool enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society.
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While Rousseau says that, in theory, 'the earth belongs to no one,' in the Second Discourse he also argues that well before the first actual enclosures of land, humans had already psychologically moved away from assuming nature was unmarked by divisions of human power. People had, he argued, already realized that only in theory, and not in practice, were the earth's abundant fruits freely available to all, since the stronger or cleverer could always deprive the weaker of an equal share in these fruits. The installation of civil society, however, formalizes an intentional distribution of these natural goods, however equitable or inequitable this distribution might be.
While later radicals would alter Rousseau's infamous line to mean "All property is theft" (and still others would praise the right of the superior first comer to what he had duped others out of), Rousseau's main point is something quite different. It is this:
that every division made, every line thus drawn around some domain, is 1) arbitrary and 2) it requires the overt or tacit agreement of others if it is to be sustained.
Rousseau's position is thus that human social space is constituted, first of all, by an imaginary drawing of lines, which then become the legal fictions that support the social division of wealth -and that everyone must agree on or consent to them that if these arbitrarily drawn lines are to found civil society as a society of laws. It follows that these laws must then be far from immutable or eternal in character. For, should the people come to believe that the lines have been drawn erroneously or have enabled a tyranny that should not stand, they can move to erase them and abolish the order they have founded so awry. In other words: 'the consent of the governed' for legitimate order is already implied in Rousseau's famous sentence.
In this regard, the passage is therefore the equivalent of another of Rousseau's lines, though not so famous, from his Social Contract 13 : Opposing the long held belief that laws are eternal and that flawed human beings must be forced to conform to them to improve themselves, Rousseau makes an entirely new departure when he states that in his work "he takes men as they are, and the laws as they might be." Rousseau's is perhaps the first non-mythic approach to the human relation to dividing space. He is not nostalgic for a lost, pastoral Golden Age where all freely roamed and shared equally-although he has certainly been accused of this. But he also did not participate in the alternative chosen by his contemporaries: a dream of "perfectibility" and inevitable progress toward a utopia wherein divisions and differences would also disappear. The originality of Lacan's theory is that discourses structure the subject and evoke its psychical responses, which to me seems indisputable. But what most interpreters of Lacan, who too often prefer to imagine his Symbolic Order as a heavyhanded, meat-fisted regime of coercion, generally fail to realize is the degree to which discourses do shift, and that this shift is absolutely crucial to Lacan's perspective. "Love is," after all, he says, "a sign you are changing discourses." This phrase appears in his Seminar XX, in which he continued the ethical exploration of psychoanalysis begun in his seventh seminar in order to try to account for the emerging feminine and its subjective ethic.
So if Lacan makes us aware that social ties--discourses-impact the psyche, he also knows that he (or any other teacher or analyst) must experience this impact not as turns the 'wall' between these seemingly discrete entities (culture and psyche) into their common horizon: a horizon that can never be reached, a line that ever-recedes, yet on which we must vigilantly keep our focus.
IV. But, Do We Still Need Borderlines?
The Extrapolated as a full-blown regime, of course, patriarchal social order has tended to draw strong lines and firm distinctions between or among things: between "this"/"that"; us/them; men/women. Paternal authority has therefore traditionally defined the limits that decide our human standing--a territory demarcated here, a practice forbidden there, a differentiating between sexes. Patriarchy drew the line.
Even before Haraway, feminism challenged the power of patriarchy on almost every point, seeking the overthrow of patriarchal authority, and questioning strongly the priority of metaphor (Kristeva, e.g.) over other figures of speech, such as metonymy.
Metonymy chains "this" to "that" rather than it does not distinguish or separate distinguishes or separates between them: it takes a part connected to something larger and makes it stand for that larger entity: "1,000 sails"=1,000 ships. For Haraway, woman's metonymic capacity-their "connectedness" is what affords women a stronger relationship than men's to the plant and animal kingdoms-and, surprisingly-also to machines, which have become our new form of "life." Thus, rule by differentiation, drawing lines, must now, according to Haraway, be displaced by a new version of 'reproducible life' that includes, rather than excludes anything and everything. From the inorganic to the super-organic all are equally submitted to natural rather than man-made laws, to the biochemical codes that universally unite all the elements, forms and forces in nature:
In modern biologies, the translation of the world into a problem in coding Articulations produce words and meaning. A crucial nothing thus supports the more primary distinction between the (non-languaged) animal and speaking human being.
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We need to imagine the borderless universe not as automatically free and unfettered but as potentially retrograde and unfree; a universe that threatens to close in on us, encapsulating us.
But it is also true that it is virtually impossible to believe that the gaps/articulations of speech are sufficient any longer to give us a little breathing room, a space for creativity, room for a 'next' signifier to emerge and refigure the meaning of all that came before. One clearly has room to doubt that it was it a desire to stabilize egos around an inherently unstable borderline. To my mind, I believe it had the same motivation it still has for those of use who are also artists. Rather than 'making space' or 'making room' by defining and designating specific spaces, and rather even than the metaphoric spacing that creates a new 'opening' as the cultural innovator is thought to do, I believe that the mark, the drawn line, serves the function of opening out, but in an entirely different, inverse, mode. It is the mode of an écriture that splits the overwhelming totality of nature and marks itself off against the unity of Being.
To draw a line is to make at least a scratching on the surface of a 'whole' (Nature, the Social Order) that has either gone lifeless or that speaks to us only in cold commands-or ceases to speak to us at all. Instead, I will argue that the line distills our experience of being human, split off from Being, and that when we make it we are leaving it specifically for others as a new part of their experience.
I recently visited the cave at Pech Merle, in southern France, whose ancient drawings produced in me an amazing set of sensations. These drawings pre-existed me by 25,000 years. Yet because I draw and because these ancient artists also drew, these unnamed and unknowable ancestors nevertheless were instantly and intimately familiar.
Not only to me, but also to anyone who engages human experience by marking it apart-taking our distance from it in time (memory) and in space. neither Freud nor Lacan saw the ego, normal, psychotic or neurotic, in isolation from the socio-symbolic order, nor from the language that shapes it (e.g., the signifier, for Lacan, or for Freud, 'the symptom'). Below I discuss why, nonetheless, their theory does not mean that the drawing of lines itself is can or should be dispensed with. 10 Goffman explains:
The manic begins by promoting himself in the family hierarchy. He finds he no longer has the time to do his accustomed share of family chores. He increasingly orders other members around, displays anger and impatience, makes promises he feels he can break, encroaches on the equipment and space allocated to other members, only fitfully displays affection and respect, and finds he cannot bother adhering to the family schedule for meals, for going to bed and rising. He also becomes hypercritical and derogatory of family members. He moves backward to grandiose statements of the high rank and quality of his forebears and forward to an exalted view of what he proposes soon to accomplish. He beings to sprinkle his speech with unassimilated technical vocabularies. He talks loudly and constantly, arrogating to himself the place at the center of things this role assumes. The great events and personages of the day uncharacteristically evoke from him a considered and definitive opinion. He seizes on magazine articles, movies and TV shows as containing important wisdom that everyone ought to hear about in detail right now. (364)
